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Wittgenstein and Musical Formalism: A Case Revisited




Abstract: This article defends a formalist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later thought on music by com-
paring it with Eduard Hanslick’s musical formalism. In doing so, it returns to a disagreement I have had 
with Bela Szabados who, in his book Wittgenstein as a Philosophical Tone-Poet, claims that the attribution 
of formalism obscures the role that music played in the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. The paper 
scrutinizes the four arguments Szabados presents to defend his claim, pertaining to alleged differences be-
tween Wittgenstein and Hanslick on their accounts of theory, beauty, rules, and the broader significance of 
music. I will argue that in each case the similarities between Wittgenstein’s and Hanslick’s respective views 
outshine possible differences. Ultimately, I will argue that instead of rendering music a marginal phenom-
enon suited for mere entertainment, formalism –as presented by Hanslick and Wittgenstein, whom I read 
as influenced by Kant’s aesthetics– underscores music’s ability to show fundamental features of reality and 
our relation to it. Music does this precisely as a sensuous yet structured medium that is irreducible to any 
conceptually determined domain.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Hanslick, Kant, formalism, music.
Resumen: Este artículo defiende una interpretación formalista del pensamiento posterior de Wittgenstein so-
bre la música comparándolo con el formalismo musical de Eduard Hanslick. Con ese fin, reconsidera un des-
acuerdo que he tenido con Bela Szabados. Este, en su libro Wittgenstein as a Philosophical Tone-Poet, afirma 
que la atribución de formalismo oscurece el papel que la música desempeñó en el desarrollo del pensamiento 
de Wittgenstein. El artículo estudia en detalle los cuatro argumentos que Szabados presenta para defender su 
tesis, que conciernen a supuestas diferencias entre Wittgenstein y Hanslick sobre sus enfoques de la teoría, la 
belleza, las reglas y la importancia en general de la música. Argumentaré que en cada caso las semejanzas entre 
los puntos de vista de Wittgenstein y Hanslick eclipsan las posibles diferencias. En última instancia, argumen-
taré que en lugar de presentar la música como un fenómeno marginal adecuado para el mero entretenimiento, 
el formalismo —tal y como es presentado por Hanslick y Wittgenstein, a quienes entiendo bajo la influencia 
de la estética de Kant— subraya la habilidad de la música para mostrar características fundamentales de la 
realidad y de nuestra relación con ella. La música es capaz de hacer esto precisamente al ser tratada como 
un medio sensual pero estructurado que es irreductible a cualquier campo determinado conceptualmente. 
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Copyright © 2019 Hanne Appelqvist
 Ápeiron. Estudios de filosofía, monográfico «Wittgenstein. Música y arquitectura», n.º 10, 2019, pp. 9–27, 
Madrid-España (ISSN 2386 – 5326)
http://www.apeironestudiosdefilosofia.com/
Recibido: 16/1/2019   Aceptado: 11/3/2019
10
Hanne appelqvist    ●     Wittgenstein and Musical Formalism: A Case Revisited
1. Introduction
In 2006, Béla Szabados published an article titled “Wittgenstein and Musical Formalism”. In this article, 
Szabados argued that the attribution of lifelong musical formalism to Wittgenstein “obscures […] the role 
that music played in the development of his philosophy of language” (Szabados, 2006: 649; see Szabados, 
2014: 91). Such a mistaken view, Szabados then wrote, was put forth in my 2005 article, “Wittgenstein and 
the Conditions of Musical Communication”, which argued that for Wittgenstein the understanding of music 
is the ability to follow the rules that are constitutive of a musical system (Ahonen, 2005). In his subsequent 
monograph, Wittgenstein as a Musical Tone-Poet, Szabados takes up the case again, rehearsing and expanding 
his argument against the formalist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later remarks on music, though in the book 
he does not mention any proponents of that interpretation.
In this paper, I revisit the debate on Wittgenstein and formalism and defend the interpretation I advo-
cated in 2005. What I find dissatisfying in Szabados’s line of argument is the treatment it gives to Hanslick’s 
formalism on the one hand and Wittgenstein’s philosophy on the other. Szabados celebrates the traditional 
alignment of Hanslick with Wagner’s character Sixtus Beckmesser in Die Meistersinger, the pedantic critic 
obsessed by rules, and portrays Hanslick as an essentialist theorist who detaches music from its cultural sur-
roundings. And just as much as Hanslick is depicted as a narrowminded dogmatic, the later Wittgenstein is 
portrayed as the champion of anti-theoretical thinking, whose legacy lies in the philosophical therapy he envi-
sions for those trapped in the fly bottle of philosophical theories. What Hanslick really writes about music and 
what Wittgenstein means by his proposal to reject explanation in favor of mere description are questions that 
receive less scrutiny by Szabados than they merit.
In the following, I will addess the four arguments that Szabados’s presents to show that Wittgenstein’s 
later conception of music cannot be aligned with formalism. These pertain to alleged differences between Witt-
genstein’s and Hanslick’s respective views on the method of philosophy, the nature of beauty, the relevance 
of rules for music (and language), and the cultural significance of music. I will argue that, instead of pulling 
into opposite directions, Wittgenstein and Hanslick come surprisingly close in their conceptions on each point. 
Moreover, I will argue that, instead of controlling music, formalism aims to liberate music from the dominance 
of discursive thought. Precisely as an autonomous, sensuous medium that resists translation to conceptual 
thought music has the capacity to reveal something significant about our relation to reality as a whole.
2. Szabados’s Arguments
Szabados reads Hanslick as advocating a strong normativist theory of what counts as good music. Ac-
cording to him, Hanslick’s musical formalism is (i) an essentialist theory, hanging onto a “transcendent”, 
Platonist view of a unified musical structure “underneath the deceptive surface of music” (Szabados, 2014: 
61, 46, 76, 90–91, 131). Formalism is (ii) committed to an essentialist idea of beauty as a “single property in 
the music that corresponds to [the] correct application” of the adjective, “musically beautiful”, and (iii) aims 
at “formulating or following explicit rules” of music (ibid.: 61, 130, added emphasis). Finally, formalism (iv) 
suppresses the connection between music and its cultural context by promoting the autonomy of music to be 
encountered by the listener in a disinterested manner (ibid.: 93). 
Szabados grants that the early Wittgenstein may have been a formalist. This is because, according to 
him, “the author of the Tractatus was still a theorist, in particular a Platonist about meaning or beauty in music 
and language” (ibid.: 90). Such theoretical orientation is manifest in Wittgenstein’s early attempt to formulate 
an essentialist theory of language that aims at uncovering logical form beneath the conventions of everyday 
language. Analogously, Szabados suggests, the early Wittgenstein aims at unearthing “the structure of com-
position […] from the morass of feelings and irrelevant associations that music brings in its wake” (ibid.: 49). 
Referring to Wittgenstein’s 1915 remark that “a tune is a kind of tautology”, Szabados claims that, for the early 
Wittgenstein, musical themes show the structure of music, just as tautologies show the stucture of the world 
(NB 40; Szabados, 2014: 46). 
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However, in Szabados’s view, the later Wittgenstein “threw overboard Hanslick’s musical formalism 
for the reason that it isolated music from the rest of the culture and left it alone and bereft of significance” 
(ibid.: 95). Wittgenstein could not possibly have been a musical formalist, because (i’) “musical formalism is 
a philosophical theory [and] holding such a theory is consistent with the philosophical orientation of the ear-
ly, but not the later Wittgenstein” (Szabados, 2006: 650; Szabados, 2014: 89). (ii’) By contrast to Hanslick’s 
alleged commitment to an essentialist notion of beauty, the later Wittgenstein takes beauty to be irrelevant for 
aesthetics (ibid.: 61). Moreover, (iii’) Wittgenstein is hostile to the formalist emphasis on the rules of music, 
and even rejects the attempt to capture linguistic meaning by reference to rules (ibid.: 130). Finally, (iv’) by 
contrast to the disinterested aesthetic attitude, emphasized by formalists, Wittgenstein “encourages emotional 
and personal involvement” with music and stresses the “cultural resonances in a work of art” (ibid.: 80, 83). 
Szabados acknowledges that in Wittgenstein’s later work we find remarks that seem to support musical 
formalism. The statement that “music expresses itself” or a close equivalent thereof appears in Wittgenstein’s 
writing repeatedly and we find numerous references to the rules of music (BB 166–167, 178; PI §§527, 531). 
Wittgenstein compares the listener who does not remember simple tunes or fails to recognize when the bass 
enters to an animal that simply reacts to music without aesthetic understanding (LC I: 17). At the outset, these 
remarks mirror Hanslick’s account. After all, Hanslick argues that music expresses itself, claims that musical 
aesthetics ought to focus on the “theoretic-grammatical rules” of music, and compares the “pathological”, i.e. 
empirically conditioned, mode of listening to the responses of animals (Hanslick, 2018: 3, 43–44, 109, 86). 
However, Szabados argues, to take these similarities at face value, as I have done and still do, “betrays an 
insufficient awareness of the later Wittgenstein as a dialectical thinker” (Szabados, 2006: 652–653; Szabados, 
2014: 91). Hence, the task Szabados sets himself is to “disarm [such] passages … of the impression of formal-
ism” (Szabados, 2006: 652; Szabados, 2014: 91). 
3. Theory
Szabados’s main charge against the attribution of musical formalism to the later Wittgenstein is that, 
while Hanslick’s formalism is a theory, the later Wittgenstein is an anti-theoretic thinker. As evidence, Szaba-
dos cites a conversation Wittgenstein had with Friedrich Weismann in December 1930. According to Wais-
mann, Wittgenstein said: “What is valuable in a Beethoven sonata? […] My answer is: Whatever one said to 
me, I would reject it; not indeed because the explanation is false but because it is an explanation” (E 15–16). 
This statement Szabados construes as repudiating “the very idea of a philosophical theory of music” and 
thus showing that “the attribution of life-long formalism to Wittgenstein is a falsetto” (Szabados, 2006: 652; 
Szabados, 2014: 90). 
However, Szabados’s construal overlooks the fact that, in the reported remark, Wittgenstein rejects the 
possibility of a theory of music’s value. Moreover, the conversation with Waismann can hardly be treated as 
evidence of Wittgenstein’s later views, as it took place in 1930, i.e., roughly at the time of Wittgenstein’s 1929 
“Lecture on Ethics”. As evident from the lecture, Wittgenstein still endorsed the Tractarian view that ethical 
and aesthetic value cannot be expressed in language, because language is exclusively in the business of pictur-
ing contingent facts. Accordingly, while relative value judgments may be expressed by reference to facts, all 
attempts to express absolute value will lead to nonsense (TLP 6.4–6.421; E 6–7, 11). 
But this just means that a rejection of a theory of musical value is precisely what is to be expected from 
Wittgenstein. It is to be expected, not because Wittgenstein is developing his later anti-theoretic approach, but 
because he is still drawing on the Tractarian view that ethics and aesthetics are inexpressible. This is not to say 
that the later Wittgenstein is more open to a philosophical treatment of value. Indeed, the absence of practically 
any remarks on ethics is one of the characteristic features of Wittgenstein later work. But it does not follow that 
his later view is hostile to a philosophical, i.e. grammatical, investigation of musical meaning and understand-
ing. These are themes that occupy Wittgenstein from 1930s onwards both in the case of language and music. 
Even so, Szabados’s general argument builds on a fairly standard claim on a perceived difference be-
tween the early and the later Wittgenstein. This is the claim that the early Wittgenstein was in the business of 
contructing a theory, whereas the later Wittgenstein rejects all theories, arguments, and general philosophical 
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claims (see, e.g., Baker, 2006). Such a contrast is, to an extent, justified and acknowledged by Wittgenstein 
himself. However, it is too simplistic as such. This is because, in addition to important differences, there is also 
a deep continuity in Wittgenstein’s conception of the nature of philosophy, pertaining precisely to the idea of 
a philosophical theory or doctrine. 
It is true that, in the Tractatus, we may find what has traditionally been called the “picture theory of 
meaning”. According to this account, every meaningful proposition is a picture of a possible state of affairs. 
Picturing is made possible, first, by a shared pictorial form and second, by a pictorial relation established be-
tween the simple elements of the picture and the pictured (TLP 2.15–2.17). The pictorial form of language is 
logical form, which language shares with reality. This form crystallizes in the general form of a proposition, 
“This is how things stand”, to which every meaningful proposition must conform (TLP 4.5). Moreover, Witt-
genstein explicitly states that the general propositional form gives us the “essence of all description, and thus 
the essence of the world” (TLP 5.472). 
Another feature of Wittgenstein’s early view that seems to commit him to an essentialist theory is that 
the Tractatus aims at uncovering the hidden form of language. While Wittgenstein grants that the “proposi-
tions of everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order”, the surface features of propositions 
nonetheless disguise their logical form (TLP 5.5562, 4.002). It is the task of analysis to uncover this form, i.e., 
to reveal the simple elements of propositions in their immediate combinations and how they are correlated 
with the simple elements of the depicted state of affairs (TLP 3.201, 3.25, 4.221). These simple elements, i.e., 
objects, Wittgenstein calls the “substance of the world” (TLP 2.021). But given that Wittgenstein famously 
gives no examples of such analysed propositions, the Tractarian idea of analysis remains a mere theoretical 
promise (TLP 5.55).
However, in my view, it is a mistake to treat Wittgenstein’s early account as a form of Platonism or as 
committed to a “transcendent point of view”, as Szabados claims (Szabados, 2014: 76). Szabados’s reading 
overlooks the distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental, using the terms interchangeably 
(cf. Szabados, 2014: 76, 91, 131). In the Kantian tradition where the distinction originates, the “transcendent” 
indicates the noumenal realm beyond knowledge. The “transcendental”, in turn, refers to the necessary a priori 
conditions for the possibility of knowledge (CPR A 56/B86; A 296/B352). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does 
not use the term transcendence.1 However, he does characterize logic, ethics, and aesthetics as transcenden-
tal (TLP 6.13, 6.421). As argued already by Erik Stenius, the relevant passages and indeed the project of the 
Tractatus may be read as reflecting the Kantian tradition of philosophy that aims at determining the necessary 
conditions for the possibility knowledge, which correspond to the limits of knowledge (Stenius 1960, ch. 11). 
In the Tractatus, the limits of language are not drawn from an independent, transcendent viewpoint, but from 
within language: “It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other 
side of the limit will simply be nonsense” (TLP, p. 3). (Incidentally, this is the way in which Wittgenstein 
understood Kant’s philosophical method. See LWL, 73–74.) Logic as well as ethics and aesthetics (which 
Wittgenstein claims to be one) are concerned with the a priori conditions for the possibility of thought (in the 
case of logic) and evaluative judgments (in the case of ethics and aesthetics). By contrast to Plato, then, whose 
“essences” were “transcendent”, objective ideas, independent of the subject, Wittgenstein’s early view may 
be read (and has been read) as a variant of transcendental idealism with the important qualification that any 
doctrine of the transcendent is eliminated (see Moore, 2013; Appelqvist, 2013, 2016).  
The main target of Wittgenstein’s later criticism of the Tractatus is the idea of a general propositional 
form. Accordingly, a great bulk of the Philosophical Investigations is dedicated to undermining the Tractarian 
views that to have meaning a word must correspond to a simple object and that the primary task of proposi-
tions is to picture states of affairs (see PI §§46–48, 66–67, 95, 108, 114, 134–136). There are different kinds 
of words and sentences that should not be assimilated into one general propositional form (PI §22). Nor do 
reference and picturing have such a central role in language as the Tractatus assumes (PI §§23, 27). Instead 
of aiming at uncoversing the hidden essence of language, the task of the philosopher is to describe the ways 
1 Wittgenstein uses the term “transcendent” exactly once in the Notebooks 1914–1916. There, he writes that “ethics is transcendent” 
(NB 79). However, in the final text of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein has replaced the term by “transcendental” (TLP 6.421).
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in which words and sentences are actually used, as “philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of 
language” (PI §124; see §§122, 126–133).
As mentioned, these obvious differences between Wittgenstein’s early and later accounts should not hide 
a deeper affinity between the two positions. In his lectures in the beginning of the 1930s, Wittgenstein notes 
that the idea of logical analysis of language was a digression into thinking along the lines of natural science, 
as it confused “logical analysis, with chemical analysis” (M 7: 39; cf. PI §521). However, he acknowledges 
that this digression was, in an important sense, a digression against his own early commitment, according to 
which logic must be independent of empirical facts (TLP 2.012, 2.0121, 5.43, 5.473). This commitment lies 
at the very core of Wittgenstein’s early conception of the nature of philosophy. According to him, “philosophy 
is not one of the natural sciences”, which is to say that “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” 
(TLP 4.111, 4.112). And this is a conception that Wittgenstein never gives up. 
Hence, while rejecting a number of key assumptions of the Tractatus, such as the general propositional 
form, an unalterable substance grounding logical form, and the logical independence of elementary proposi-
tions, the later Wittgenstein still claims that logical or grammatical inquiry must be independent of empirical 
research (PI §§90, 232, 392). In his view, natural science is an enterprise of testing and forming hypotheses 
and explaining phenomena by reference to causal, reductionist, mechanistic models. Philosophy, by contrast, 
does not aim at uncovering new facts about the world or formulating hypotheses, but aims at organizing what 
we already know in such a way that dissolves philosophical confusions (PI §§92, 122–129; see LWL 72–79). 
That he believed that he got this much right even in the Tractatus is evident from his remark:
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out 
empirically ‘that contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and such’ – whatever that may mean. (The 
conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And 
description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical 
problems […]. (PI §109)
In short, the contrast between Wittgenstein’s early and the later views on the method of philosophy is 
not a contrast between a full-blown theory and anti-theory, as Szabados claims. It is rather a contrast between 
Wittgenstein early commitment to a universal and unalterable logical form to be uncovered underneath the 
conventions of everyday language and his later view that the grammatical rules of language do not stand in 
need of a universal, immutable foundation. In Wittgenstein’s later view, rules of grammar “may be called 
‘arbitrary’, if that is to mean that the purpose of the grammar is nothing but that of language” (PI §497). The 
rules of grammar are autonomous in the sense that they cannot be justified by reference to anything outside of 
language. Hence, the task of the philosopher is to describe what “lies open to view” (PI §126). 
My final objection to Szabados’s claim about a principled difference between Hanslick and Wittgenstein 
on theory concerns his interpretation of Hanslick’s essay as putting forth a Platonist, “transcendentalist” theory 
of what counts as good music. This is a surprising allegation, given that the main target of Hanslick’s essay is the 
Platonist view of an “uppermost metaphysical principle of a general aesthetics” to which all fields of art must 
conform (Hanslick, 2018: 2). In the aesthetics of music, the main candidate for such a principle is the view that 
the primary function of music is the expression, arousal, or representation of feelings. In Hanslick’s view, these 
different versions of the emotivist account of music are flawed, first, because they presuppose that all forms of 
art must be about something and subsume music under this general principle. Second, by identifying emotions 
as that which music (somehow) is about, the emotivist account assimilates different musical works and styles 
into the service of one goal, namely, the communication of emotions. In my reading, the general shape of this 
negative argument is not unlike Wittgenstein’s later rejection of picturing as the only function of propositions.
Hanslick’s positive proposal is equally in accord with Wittgenstein’s later view, namely, that the descrip-
tion of language-games will help us eliminate philosophical confusions resulting from our tendency to over-
look differences between the concrete ways in which language is used (PI §§108, 126). For Hanslick argues 
that instead of subsuming music under a general principle of aesthetics common to all fields of art, and instead 
of assigning a single function for music, musical aesthetics should focus on the “theoretic-grammatical rules” 
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of music itself. This is because “every art must be known on its own technical terms, grasped in and of itself” 
(Hanslick, 2018: 2). 
Hanslick’s approach is not committed to a “transcendent viewpoint” either, if by “transcendent” we 
mean a domain that transcends the sensuously given appearances of music. Referring to the received emotivist 
account of music, Hanslick writes: “Our view on the seat of intellect and feeling of a composition relates to 
the common opinion […] as the concept of immanence relates to transcendence” (Hanslick, 2018: 46). The 
very point of his essay is to direct musical aesthetics away from the feelings of composers standing behind 
the composition and the feelings music arouses in the listeners. These versions of the emotivist account treat 
music either as a secondary effect or as a stimulus. In this respect, they seek to explain music’s content by ref-
erence to something over and above music, and do so by appealing to a causal model. Hanslick’s own proposal 
prioritizes the musical rules that are constitutive of musical works and performances. These are not hidden in 
some transcendent realm, but available to anyone who is willing to listen to music without subsuming it under 
extramusical conceptual or psychological principles (ibid.: 3–13). 
Again, Hanslick’s characterization of music’s content as an immanent phenomenon, constituted by spe-
cifically musical rules, may be seen as a musical variant of Wittgenstein’s later conception of language as a 
family of different language games, each constituted by its respective sets of rules (PI §§23, 199). Like Witt-
genstein, whose grammatical method aims at disarming the seductive ideal of a general propositional form, 
Hanslick’s argument aims at directing the listener to the concrete phenomenon of music by denying that all 
music is expressive of emotions. If we want to grasp the content of music without falling back on technical or 
metaphorical descriptions, we will have to play the theme itself: “the content of a musical work can be grasped 
only musically, never graphically: i.e. as that which is actually sounding in each piece” (Hanslick, 2018: 113). 
Wittgenstein’s approval of this approach is evident in his remark: “But in most cases if someone asked me 
How do you think this melody should be played, I will, as an answer, just whistle it in a particular way, and 
nothing will have been present in my mind but the tune actually whistled (not an image of that)” (BB 166). 
As suggested by the subtitle of Hanslick’s essay –“A Contribution to the Revision of the Aesthetics of 
Music”– the formalist view has important consequences for aesthetics and art criticism. If music’s content is 
constituted by the autonomous, specifically musical rules that govern the use of musical expressions, and if it 
is impossible to adequately express that content in any other medium besides music itself, then the traditional 
roles of the aesthetician and the critic as theoretical authorities who determine the content of a given work is 
undermined. If one wants to grasp the meaning of a simple musical element, phrase, or a theme, then one must 
personally listen to how it is used in the context of music. The guiding principle arising from the formalist 
position, then, is to “look and see”, or rather, “listen and hear”, as the content of music cannot be captured 
conceptually. As far as I can see, this methodological view is as close as it gets to a musical version of Witt-
genstein’s later descriptive method of philosophy.   
 
4. Beauty
Szabados’s second contrast between Wittgenstein and Hanslick relates to the role and relevance of beau-
ty in their respective treatments of music. According to him, Hanslick “lumps all good music together under 
the rubric of the ‘musically beautiful’”, “construes it as an adjective, and then looks for a single property in 
the music that corresponds to its correct application”, whereas “according to Wittgenstein such a move is a 
ground-floor mistake” (Szabados, 2014: 61). It is true that in his lectures on aesthetics Wittgenstein rejects 
the idea of a single property labeled “the beautiful”. In 1933, he criticizes the view for assuming the beautiful 
to be “an ingredient in beautiful things: & could be sort of caught in a bottle by itself, like an essence” (M 9: 
10). In 1938, he states: “The subject (Aesthetics) is very big and entirely misunderstood as far as I can see. 
The use of such words as beautiful is even more apt to be misunderstood if you look at the linguistic form of 
sentences in which it occurs than most other words. Beautiful is an adjective, so you are inclined to say: This 
has a certain quality, that of being beautiful.” (LC I: 1; cf. M 9: 19.) In accordance with his later method of 
philosophy, Wittgenstein recommends looking at how people actually use the term “beautiful” instead (LC I: 
8; cf. M 9: 12–13). 
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However, Hanslick does not, pace Szabados, advocate a single property called the “musically beauti-
ful”. According to him, we should not think of musical forms as empty bottles that may or may not be filled 
with the champagne of intellectual content, for “musical champagne has the characteristic of growing with the 
bottle” (Hanslick, 2018: 46–47). In fact, the mistake Wittgenstein attributes to aesthetics in general, Hanslick 
attributes to musical aesthetics. According to him, aesthetics of poetry, literature, and visual arts have “dis-
carded the delusion that the aesthetics of a particular art could be achieved by merely adapting the general, 
metaphysical concept of beauty” (Hanslick, 2018: 2). The aesthetics of music ought to take the same route, 
and do so by focusing on the concrete, sonically moved, audible forms. As Geoffrey Payzant has argued, for 
Hanslick, “the musically beautiful” is simply an equivalent of “sonically moved forms” (Payzant, in Hanslick, 
1986: 93–94). It is just another expression for the autonomous content of music in all its variety –not a uniform 
property that some musical works have and others do not. Hanslick’s term the “musically beautiful” is not an 
evaluative term either. He writes:
The entire course of the present investigation does not declare any Should Be but rather considers only what Is. No partic-
ular musical ideal may be deduced from that standpoint as authentic beauty; rather, it may merely be demonstrated what 
beauty is in every style in the same way, even in the most opposed ones. (Hanslick, 2018: 54–55)  
Accordingly, Hanslick’s recommended approach of “considering only what Is” accords perfectly with 
Wittgenstein’s later remark that “Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything” (PI §126). It also accords with Wittgenstein’s view on what theses in philosophy would look like, 
namely, that “it would never be possible to debate them, because everybody would agree with them” (PI §128). 
For what would it mean to deny that the music consists of “sonically moved forms”? To state as much is simply 
to state a truism.
So why does Hanslick choose the “musically beautiful” as the key phrase of his view, if he does not 
subscribe to the idea of a property of beauty common to all musical works? In my reading, the reason for this 
choice lies in the historical background of Hanslick’s argument, specifically in his allegiance to a Kantian 
framework of aesthetics (see Appelqvist, 2011). In Kant’s account, beauty is not a property we ascribe to 
objects by subsuming them under a determinate concept (CPJ § 1). Rather, the beautiful is a type of aesthetic 
judgment that ought to be distinguished from pathologically conditioned judgments of the agreeable. While 
judgments of the agreeableness of food and wine are based on the subject’s empirically conditioned reactions 
to objects, the judgment of the beautiful arises out of a disinterested contemplation of the form of the sensuous-
ly given representation of the object (CPJ §§ 3, 5). Given that judgments of the agreeable reflect empirical laws 
of nature, i.e., follow the pattern of stimulus and response, we cannot attribute universal validity to them but 
treat them as contingent preferences. However, judgments of beauty are presented as universally valid. When 
I judge something to be beautiful, I claim that the relation between the form of the object and my pleasure is 
necessary despite the fact that I cannot conceptually justify my judgment (CPJ §§ 7–8, 18).
Hanslick’s account of the musically beautiful follows Kant in the above respects. For Hanslick, the 
musically beautiful cannot be conceptually explained; it is “independent and not in need of external content, 
something that resides solely in the tones and their artistic connection” (Hanslick, 2018: 40). This view cor-
responds to Kant’s general emphasis on the form of the representation as the proper object of aesthetic con-
templation, independent of subjective charms and emotions. It also corresponds to Kant’s specific dictum of 
the composition as that which is properly judged to be beautiful in music. (CPJ §§ 14, 16). In accordance with 
Kant’s crucial distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful, Hanslick draws a distinction between two 
approaches to music. The first, “pathological” approach is only concerned with the subjective and contingent 
effects of music and thereby aligns music with mere “products of nature”, like “the sweet fragrance of an aca-
sia” (Hanslick, 2018: 83; see also ibid.: 6). The term “pathological” is here used in Kant’s sense, namely, as 
an empirically conditioned response to a stimulus, characteristic of judgments of the agreeable that influence 
animals as well (CPJ § 5). By contrast, the listener who approaches music in the second, “aesthetic” manner, 
listens to a piece of music “for its own sake”, not allowing music to “sink to the level of sensuous natural 
stimuli” (Hanslick, 2018: 91, 60). 
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Strikingly, Wittgenstein’s longest sustained discussion on the beautiful, given in his lectures in 1933, follows 
the above Kantian line of thought. He replaces the property-based approach in aesthetics by describing aes-
thetic judgments made of such phenomena as music, architecture, and even the choosing of a wallpaper –an 
example we find in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment as well (M 9: 16, 9: 29; cf. CPJ § 16). Moreover, 
he repeatedly stresses that there is an important distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful, using the 
former term in the Kantian sense, to refer to feelings causally induced by smells or tastes of food (M 9: 14, 9: 
20, 9: 26; see LC II: 2–4; CV 65). Finally, Wittgenstein identifies the normative force of judgments of beauty 
as the key difference between the agreeable and the beautiful. The agreeable is a matter of causal, contingent 
connections between the object and the subject, but the beautiful is not: “But if we meant by ‘beautiful’ ‘giv-
ing me stomach-ache /pleasure/’, then it would be merely a symptom: experience would tell us whether it 
does or not” (M 9: 18). Hence, in accordance with his early and late insistence that logic/grammar is not an 
experimental matter, Wittgenstein assigns a non-experimental status for aesthetics as well. Psychology is not 
relevantly related to aesthetics, because psychological explanations are given by reference to causes, whereas 
aesthetic explanation (like philosophical explanations) aim at giving reasons by showing new connections 
within an aesthetic system (see LC II, LC III: 7-12; M 9: 26–41). Accordingly, “aesthetics is ‘descriptive’” just 
like philosophy in general (M 9: 23).
Like Hanslick, Wittgenstein draws a distinction between the merely pleasure-seeking and aesthetic ways 
of listening to music, connecting the latter to musical understanding. He states: “We use the phrase ‘A man is 
musical’ not so as to call a man musical if he says ‘Ah!’ when a piece of music is played, any more than we 
call a dog musical if it wags its tail when music is played” (LC I: 17). The dog –just like the elephant, bear, and 
horse, Hanslick mentions as examples of animals affected by music– reacts to music mechanically, based on 
natural, physical and neurological, laws. In Wittgenstein’s view, we do not apply the notion of understanding 
to the dog, just like we do not say that dogs lie or talk to themselves (PI §§ 250, 357, 650). The notions of un-
derstanding, lying, and talking to oneself are phenomena that become meaningful only within a grammatical 
system that grounds the possibility of giving reasons. Hence, “If I ask, ‘Why do you like this tune’ & answer 
is ‘Because it reminds me of my grandmother’, this doesn’t interest me” (M 9: 40). It does not interest Witt-
genstein, nor any other formalist, because the association with one’s grandmother is only contingently related 
to the tune. Aesthetic reasons, by contrast, are more like observations of the aesthetic system itself (M 9: 40). 
According to Szabados, the later Wittgenstein rejects “cold” disinteredness as an essential feature of aes-
thetic judgment and “encourages emotional and personal involvement” with music instead (Szabados, 2014: 
80). But neither Kant nor Hanslick –main proponents of the disinterested aesthetic attitude– denies that judg-
ments of beauty are grounded in personal responses to something particular. Their requirement of the non-con-
ceptuality of judgments of beauty actually entails that the sensibly given forms must be perceived by the 
subject, as we cannot make aesthetic judgments by applying conceptual rules or by imitating others (cf. CPJ 
§17). What disinterestedness requires is rather that contingent charms and emotions and empirically condi-
tioned feelings of agreeableness are abstracted away from the judgment. Beauty ought to be contemplated for 
its own sake, as “beauty has no purpose at all […] beyond itself” (Hanslick, 1986: 3; cf. CPJ §11). Wittgenstein 
follows suit. He grants that “perhaps the most important thing in aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic 
reactions, e.g. discontent, digust, discomfort” (LC II: 10). Yet, he warns against assimilating such reactions to 
merely subjective feelings: “Suppose you find a bass too heavy –that it moves too much; you aren’t saying: If 
it moves less, it will be more agreeable to me. That it should be quieter is an end in itself, not a means to an 
end” (M 9: 20).
In my reading, Wittgenstein’s reason for emphasizing the distinction between the agreeable and the 
beautiful echoes Kant’s view that judgments of beauty require a transcendental, rather than an experimental 
ground. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein called aesthetics “transcendental” (TLP 6.421). However, in his later 
philosophy, Wittgenstein does not employ the term, most likely because it carries the problematic connotation 
of universality. However, Wittgenstein does not give up the general point that aesthetic judgments cannot be 
explained by reference to empirical facts. If aesthetics were about contingent likes or dislikes, then psycholo-
gy could provide an exhaustive story about aesthetics. But when we make aesthetic judgments, we are saying 
more: “When I say ‘This bass moves too much’ I don’t mean merely ‘It gives me such & such impression’, 
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because if I did I should have to be content with the answer ‘It does not give me that impression’” (M 9: 28; 
cf. M 9: 26–27). 
That Wittgenstein takes aesthetic judgments to have normative force distinct from empirical statements 
is evident from his own examples: “One example of an aesthetic question is question about harmony. In a book 
on harmony you find no trace of psychology. It says: you mustn’t make this transition, etc.” (9: 14). We are not 
looking for a single property, but say that a certain choice in an aesthetic system is “correct”, “right”, “wrong”, 
or even “necessary”; that “the bass is too loud”, that it “moves too much, should be quiter” (M 9: 19, 9: 23). 
These are normative judgments in the sense that they evoke what Wittgenstein calls an “aesthetic ideal” of 
how specific features of the object ought to be arranged for them to “click” (LC III: 1). Hence, what looking at 
real aesthetic discussions reveals is that “The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an 
aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by experience or by statistics as to how 
people react” (LC III: 11). This brings us to the third alleged difference between Hanslick and Wittgenstein, 
namely, the role and relevance of rules in musical practices.  
  
5. Rules
Treating Wagner’s caricaturish character Beckmesser as the prototype of a formalist, Szabados claims 
that formalism “attempts to create or capture musical meaning via formulating or following explicit rules” 
(Szabados, 2014: 130). Such “obsessive preoccupation with rules not only fails to do justice to the musical 
tradition but leads to lifeless, mechanical repetition” (ibid.: 130). According to Szabados, Wittgenstein rejects 
a rule-based “formalist approach” even in his later philosophy of language, because the attempt to capture the 
meaning of words and propositions “through a rule” only leads to a regress of interpretations (ibid.: 130; see 
PI §201). Similarly, Szabados argues, Wittgenstein abandons his early view that “tunes and themes show the 
structure of music” in favor of a more inclusive position that allows “allusion, reference, [and] representation”, 
as well as “composer’s intentions, as well as cultural, biographical and social context to play a role in critical 
inquiry” of music (Szabados, 2014: 46, 105, 151). 
If formalism advocated “explicit rules” as the key to the understanding of music or language, then 
Szabados’s criticism would be to the point with respect to both musical formalism and Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy of language. But again, this interpretation is misguided on both accounts. When Hanslick writes 
about musical rules, he is not referring to a manual of explicit and strict rules that Wagner’s Beckmesser cites 
to repudiate Walther von Stolzing’s original contest song. The rules he has in mind are basic structuring princi-
ples of the Western tonal system. Moreover, as suggested by his famous slogan according to which the content 
of music is “Tönend bewegte Formen”, the musical forms are in dynamic movement that happens sonically. 
Accordingly, the rules of music are given in the sounding reality of music, in musical performances. Similarly, 
when the later Wittgenstein writes about the rules of language (as well as music), he is not interested in explicit 
and fixed rules. In 1938, Wittgenstein states: 
What I call a rule of grammar is not what would be found in grammar books […] Ordinary grammar rules are about the 
order of words, gender, etc. No one could learn the use of language from such a grammar. It only gives a tiny bit of rules 
about the use of language. It is chiefly designed to make you avoid mistakes. (WCL, 62–63)
While Wittgenstein’s later grammatical method of philosophy is (undeniably) formulated by reference 
to “grammar”, “rules”, and “rule-following”, these notions should not be read as indicating such “explicit and 
fixed” rules we find in ordinary grammar books. Rather, the rules have life in practice: they are given in con-
crete instances of their application and learned via examples and training. (PI §§71, 75, 208)
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein distinguishes between a rule-formulation and a rule. 
The former is an explicitly formulated expression of a rule, whereas the latter is given in the rule’s concrete 
applications. If the rules were regulative rules governing an otherwise independent activity of language, then 
the philosopher could indeed “police the borders” between sense and nonsense, pointing out mistakes of lan-
guage use (cf. Morris in Baker, 2006: 1). However, as the rules are constitutive of the linguistic practices, the 
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philosopher can only point to connections within a language-game by describing the ways in which words and 
sentences are actually employed. This is to say that the philosopher’s task is to describe, not explain or justify, 
the use of language (cf. PI §124).
Moreover, the infinite regress to which Szabados refers occurs only if we hope to find a rule-formula-
tion that will fix, once and for all, the correct application of a rule. Wittgenstein writes about the paradox of 
rule-following, arising out of the attempt to fix the application of a rule by interpretation, as follows:
That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation 
behind another, as if each one contended us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it. For what 
we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of 
application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”. (PI §201)
Here, “interpretation” refers to an explicit rule-formulation, as Wittgenstein explicitly states: “one should 
speak of ‘interpretation’ only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another” (PI §201). The regress 
of interpretations of a rule follows if we equate understanding with the ability to formulate the rule, for any 
formulation calls for yet another rule-formulation to determine how the new formulation ought to be applied. 
But it does not follow that, for Wittgenstein, there is no such thing as “grasping a rule”, “following a rule”, or 
“going against it”. The misunderstanding is rather the illusion that any given rule-formulation could unam-
biguously capture the actual rule exhibited in practice. This is to say that, instead of abandoning the notion of 
a rule tout court, Wittgenstein refines the concept of rule-following, which is intended to serve as a model of 
understanding (PI §§143–148, 155).
The gist of the formalist position is this: music and its rules –just like language and its rules– are not 
independent of one another. Instead, the relation between the two is internal, constitutive, or grammatical. A 
given musical rule –for example, that in tonal music the dominant is followed by the tonic that functions as a 
resolution to the tension built up by the dominant– is primarily given in actual musical works or performanc-
es thereof. And the constitutive relation goes in the other direction too: musical works themselves are made 
possible by the rules they exemplify. The composer could not compose anything without using some musical 
rules, any more than we could express conceptual thoughts without using language: “It is only in a language 
that I can mean something by something” (PI 22).    
When Hanslick states that “the content of music is sonically moved forms”, one way to understand his 
point is by reference to the constitutive relation between music and its rules (Hanslick, 2018: 41). If the musi-
cal forms and their movement were subject to external criteria drawn from a political agenda, a poem to which 
the music is composed, or an attempt to musically resemble the psychological dynamic of human emotions, 
then the resulting music would be heteronomous in the sense of following laws or principles external to itself. 
By contrast, the view advocated by Hanslick is that the very possibility of music and the relevant criteria for 
the understanding and appreciation of music reside in the musical system itself. We find the same general point 
in Wittgenstein’s later thought: 
Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People do not come 
to blows over it, for example. This is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (for example, 
in giving descriptions). (PI §240)   
Szabados correctly points out that, in Wittgenstein’s view, such musical forms as string quartet, sympho-
ny, and oratorio, most likely cease to play a significant role in the future (Szabados, 2014: 88). Instead of rely-
ing on grand musical forms, Wittgenstein focuses on melodies and treats them in accordance with the context 
principle, central for his later thought. According to Szabados, this indicates Wittgenstein’s “turn away from 
musical formalism” (Szabados, 2006: 655). Maybe so, but in that case the view Szabados calls “formalism” 
has little to do with Hanslick’s position. For Hanslick does not prioritize grand musical forms that characterize 
the overall structure of the entire musical work in his essay. He is more interested in the basic elements out of 
which those grand forms are composed, namely, chords, cadences, simple melodic motifs, and most important-
ly, melodies. Indeed, according to Hanslick, “in every composition, the independent unit of musical thought, 
aesthetically not capable of further division, is the theme” (Hanslick, 2018: 112). 
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Now, Wittgenstein’s recurring analogy between a musical theme and a sentence serves as an example of 
what it means for a word or a sentence to have a meaning as use in a context. This is because a given musical 
expression, such as a chord or a cadence, acquires meaning, not by referring to something beyond itself, but by 
having a function or a role within a system. The contextuality of musical elements is not unfamiliar to Hanslick 
either. There are several passages in Hanslick’s essay, where he discusses explicitly the contextuality of musi-
cal elements, for example: “the composer places the theme into the most diverse contexts and environments, 
into the most varying outcomes and mood” (Hanslick, 2018: 113–114). Moreover, Hanslick and Wittgenstein 
alike emphasize the historical and cultural contingency of the musical forms that we encounter in our current 
tonal system. It is not only that one should not assume that music is always expressive of emotions; one should 
also “beware of the confusion as thought this (present) tone system itself necessarily exists in nature” (ibid.: 
97). Hanslick writes: 
It follows from this […] that our tonal system, too, will undergo enrichments and modifications in the course of time. Yet 
such manifold and expansive developments are still possible within the current laws that a change in the nature of the 
system may seem very remote. (Hanslick, 2018: 98) 
We find the same observation in Wittgenstein’s lectures: “You can say that every composer changed the 
rules, but the variation was very slight; not all the rules were changed” (LC I: 16). This also means that music 
must be learned. In this respect, music resembles language, Hanslick suggests, thus appealing to an analogy 
that keeps recurring in Wittgenstein’s writings throughout his philosophical work (Hanslick: 2018, 98). Sim-
ilarly, Wittgenstein claims that people are trained and develop in the arts and, along the way, learn to make 
more and more refined judgments. In music this means, among other things, that “you are drilled in harmony 
and counterpoint” (LC I: 15).
According to Szabados, the formalist emphasis on rules makes music “lifeless” and “mechanical” 
(Szabados, 2018: 130). In my view, the motivation is the exact opposite. In the Kantian tradition, to which 
both Hanslick and Wittgenstein in my reading belong, the distinction between mechanic and artistic corre-
sponds to the distinction between empirically conditioned and free, between pathological and aesthetic (CPJ 
§§70-71). In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the distinction plays a central role. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on 
the arbitrary, conventional rules of language reflects his conviction that the meaning and the understanding 
of language are not mechanistic phenomena, explicable by reference to mental states, such as dispositions, 
or laws of nature (PI §§148-150, 199, 220, 355). Rather than being a mere fact of nature, understanding is 
a normative phenomenon: it makes sense to talk about understanding only against the possibility of misun-
derstanding. And in order to distinguish between the two, we appeal to rules as criteria of correctness.
Wittgenstein’s appeal to rules as criteria of understanding is exceptionally clear in his lectures on aesthet-
ics, where he is arguing against the assimilation of aesthetic judgments to empirically conditioned judgments. 
In 1938, he states: “Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical criticism? You say: ‘Look at this transition’, or 
‘The passage here is incoherent’. [...] The words you use are more akin to ‘right’ and ‘correct’ (as these words 
are used in ordinary speech) than to ‘beautiful’ and ‘lovely’” (LC I: 8). The words “right” and “correct” mark a 
connection to rules that serve as the criteria of understanding. As pointed out above, a mere admiration of a mu-
sical work does not yet count as a sign of understanding. Instead, one’s ability to give reasons for one’s aesthetic 
judgments by appealing to the rules of music shows that one understands: “‘Does this harmonize? No. The bass 
is not quite loud enough. Here I want something different...’ This is what we call an appreciation” (LC I: 19). 
The possibility of appreciating music rests on the ability to follow music in the first place, just as the ability to 
admire English poetry requires that one knows English (LC I: 17). “If I hadn’t learnt the rules, I wouldn’t be able 
to make an aesthetic judgment” (LC I: 15). And only after one has been “drilled in harmony and counterpoint”, 
can one start to “develop a feeling” for the rules. This will, in turn, make possible to claim that, while this tune 
does follow the rules I have originally learned, I personally do not find it beautiful (LC I: 15). 
In Wittgenstein’s view, communication by means of language requires “agreement in definitions, but 
also (queer as this may sound) in judgments” (PI §242). Similarly, the possibility of meaning something 
by musical phrases and understanding them rests on the shared rules of music. This does not make musical 
composition or understanding mechanical. The whole point of describing music by reference to arbitrary, 
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historically changing rules that are constitutive of music is to liberate music from the dominance of natural 
laws, regularities of human psychology, and conceptual thought. That music follows its own rules makes it 
capable of rising above the mechanistic laws of nature, whether physical or psychological.
  
6. Music and Reality
The classical objection to musical formalism is this: if music does not have any content other than its 
own form, then music is mere play of sounds with no meaning, significance, or relevance other than providing 
entertainment for the listener. This is also the rationale behind Szabados’s fourth argument against the attri-
bution of formalism to Wittgenstein. Szabados notices that a dominant theme in Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
music is the propositionally inexpressible character of musical themes (Szabados, 2014: 129). However, he 
fails to acknowledge that, in the history of aesthetics, the major advocates of the non-conceptual character of 
aesthetic judgments are Kant and Hanslick and assumes that Wittgenstein adopted the notion from Wagner. 
In Szabados’s view, Wittgenstein rejected formalism, because he saw a deep “connectedness between under-
standing music and other aspects of culture it is embedded in” (ibid.: 93). According to Szabados, formalism is 
incapable of sustaining such a connection, because “a strict formalist insistence on [music’s] radical autonomy 
suggests” that music is “alone and isolated from culture” (ibid.: 93). But is that really the case? The operative 
assumption here is that if music is mere form, then it is incapable of showing anything about reality and our 
place in it. As I see it, both Hanslick and Wittgenstein reject this very assumption. They both argue –granted, in 
their distinctive ways– that precisely as mere form, resisting translation into any other medium, music reveals 
something significant. 
Szabados’s statement according to which “It is crucial to understand that music for the later Wittgenstein 
was not merely, if at all, a pleasing pattern of sounds; for him, music connects with the ways we speak and 
with human forms of life” is indicative of his understanding of formalism (Szabados, 2014: 92–93). As argued 
in section 4, formalism does not treat musical forms as “pleasing patterns of sounds”. The Kantian distinction 
between the agreeable and the beautiful that we find in Hanslick and Wittgenstein –and the corresponding dis-
tinction between pathological and aesthetic listeners– underscores that musical beauty is qualitatively different 
from the subjective, pleasing effects of smoking, drinking, taking drugs, a warm bath, or smelling a flower 
(Hanslick, 2018: 8, 83, 85). These examples from Hanslick may be complemented by Wittgenstein’s examples 
of tasting vanilla ice cream, coffee, or roast beef, and by Kant’s example of enjoying sparkling wine from the 
Canaries (LC II: 2–4; M 9: 20–21; CPJ §7; cf. BB 178). For all three, the appeal to such examples serves to 
make the same point: while responses to such pleasing stimuli are determined by laws of nature, the disinter-
ested contemplation of the sounding forms of music grounds the possibility of free judgments of beauty. 
Szabados further assumes that the primary way in which music can acquire broader significance is by 
having a direct connection to human emotions. He writes: “Hanslick was (or at least has been read as) a narrow 
or traditional formalist: he not only asserted that the essence of music lies exclusively in its formal structure, 
but also denied that music can be properly described in terms of feelings and emotions” (Szabados, 2006: 621; 
cf Szabados, 2014: 96). The proviso “or at least has been read” is to the point. For it is indeed true that for-
malism is often represented as a view that rejects all but technical descriptions of music. Szabados continues 
this line of criticism by claiming that, while Wittgenstein would allow emotive characterizations of music, for 
Hanslick claims such as “this adagio is sad” are nonsense (Szabados, 2006: 653). But this is simply untrue, as 
Hanslick’s text shows:
To characterize this musical expression of a theme we often choose terms from our psychic life, like “proud, disgruntled, 
tender, valiant, yearning”. But we can also take the descriptions from other domains of life and call music “fragrant, 
spring-fresh, hazy, chilly”. For the description of musical character, feelings are thus just phenomena like others that offer 
similarities for description. We may use epithets of that sort with awareness of their figurative imagery, indeed we cannot 
do without them. But we must beware of saying, this music portrays pride, and so forth. (Hanslick, 2018: 47)
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Hanslick thus grants that, as a matter of fact, we often use emotive terminology in describing music. He 
even concedes that we cannot do without such characterizations. Trouble arises only when we read such de-
scriptions literally, for music does not speak “through tones, it speaks only tones” (ibid.: 109). Hence, Hanslick 
concludes, the heuristic contribution of emotions and other phenomena we evoke to describe music is that they 
offer us “similarities for description” (ibid.: 47). 
Wittgenstein treats extramusical characterizations of music in a like manner. A central way of providing 
aesthetic reasons in music is by giving comparisons between a musical tune and something else (see, e.g., M 
9: 31, 9: 39, 9: 41; LC III: 9). In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein provides an example of such 
a comparison:
Why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo? One would like to say “Because I know what it’s all 
about.” But what is it about? I should not be able to say. In order to ‘explain’ I could only compare it with something else 
which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern [Linie]). (PI § 527) 
Given that “I should not be able to say” what the musical theme is about, all I can do to grasp the content 
of the theme is to pay attention to its rhythm, pattern, or form. Again, as it is impossible to say, i.e., discursive-
ly express, the content of the theme, I can only compare the theme with something else that manifests the same 
pattern to convey my grasp to another. Importantly, that something else should not be treated as the content of 
the theme, as the role of the comparison is simply to direct attention to the form that is already manifest in the 
musical theme itself. Nor can I force another to accept my comparison: 
I give someone an explanation, say to him: “It is as though...”; then he says “Yes now I understand it” or “Yes now I know 
how it is to be played”.  It is not after all as though I had given him compelling reasons for comparing this passage with 
this & that. I did not explain to him that remarks made by the composer show that this passage is supposed to represent 
this & that. (CV 79)
Failing to see the point of any given comparison does not necessarily entail failure in the understanding 
of music, for comparisons are only loosely connected to music’s content. Yet, as the comparisons may succeed 
in drawing attention to a specific feature of the music, the effort to find concrete analogies for abstract musical 
structures is often worthwhile for the purposes of teaching, listening, or performing music. Most importantly, 
given the unavailability of any intersubjective grounds to determine which comparison should be preferred 
over others, we should not treat such comparisons as literal descriptions of music’s content. Instead, we should 
say, as Wittgenstein does: “Music conveys to us itself!” (BB 178).
Finally, while denying that music is expressive of human emotions or other conceptual contents, formal-
ism does not disconnect music from reality. Hanslick writes:
[M]usic is […] in fact an image, but one whose subject we cannot formulate in words and subordinate to our concepts. In 
music there is sense and logic, but musical sense and logic. It is a language that we speak and understand, but are unable 
to translate. (Hanslick, 2018: 43–44)
One way to put Hanslick’s point is to say that sense and logic are notions that are not limited to the 
realm of discursive thought, when discursive thought is understood according to the model of cognition as the 
subsumption of particulars under general concepts. Such a view of cognition we find, for example, in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason that treats cognitive judgments as instances of determining sensible intuitions by 
subsuming them under concepts. Instead of conforming to this pattern of conceptually grounded discursive 
cognition, the sense of music arises out of the inner coherence of the musical system itself. 
Hanslick’s statement about music following its own musical logic and sense serves to show that he 
does not take the conceptual perspective on the world to be exclusive. Instead of approaching music from a 
conceptual or emotional perspective, the musician and the aesthetic listener approach it by contemplating the 
musical forms themselves. This conception resonates with the view that Alexander Baumgarten attributed to 
ancient philosophers and church fathers, namely, that in addition to logic that deals with objects of conceptual 
knowledge there is a distinct domain of sensibility that is the proper object of aesthetics (Baumgarten, 1954: 
22
Hanne appelqvist    ●     Wittgenstein and Musical Formalism: A Case Revisited
§116). Kant famously endorsed Baumgarten’s view and gave it a key role in his philosophical system. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, he started by distinguishing between transcendental aesthetic and transcendental log-
ic and argued that cognition requires both. In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, he argued further that, in 
addition to conceptually grounded cognitive judgments, there is a class of judgments that are universally valid 
independently of concepts. Kant called these judgments pure judgments of taste and treated the judgment of 
as the primary example of such a judgment. While lacking concepts, judgments of beauty makes a justified 
claim to universal validity and even necessity, because the judgments are based on the mere purposiveness of 
the form of the representation (CPJ §11). The judgments of taste show their object –not mechanistically as a 
cognitive judgment would by merely subsuming the object under a determinate concept, but artistically, as an 
internally purposive whole, as if some will had arranged the object in accordance with a rule that cannot be 
conceptually explained (CPJ §10). In the case of works of art that will belongs to the artist, whose imagination 
has given a sensible shape to an aesthetic, sensible idea (CPJ 20: 217; §§70–71).
Echoing Kant, Hanslick argues that when the composer works on musical materials, he is occupying a 
domain of thought independent of the domain of conceptual thought:
Composing is an operation of the intellect in material of intellectual capacity. […] More intellectual and more subtle in 
nature than the material of any other art, the tones readily assimilate each and every idea of the composer [Künstler]. Be-
cause tone combinations, in whose relationships musical beauty resides, are not achieved through a mechanical stringing 
together but rather through the free creativity of the imagination, the intellectual power and individuality of that particular 
imagination imprint themselves on the product as character. (Hanslick, 2018: 45, added emphasis.)
While the goal of all art is to externalize ideas emerging in the artist’s imagination, in the case of music 
the relevant idea “consists of tones, not concepts, which would first have to be translated into tones” (ibid.: 
46). Once a theme or a motif has emerged in his mind, the composer presents that idea in those relationships 
that the musical system provides. The musical beauty of the idea is, in turn, given to us in immediate aesthetic 
awareness of its form that, Hanslick writes, “allows no explanation other than the inner purposiveness [innere 
Zweckmässigkeit] of the phenomenon, the harmony of its parts, without reference to an external third factor” 
(ibid.: 46, translation altered2). 
Even though the musical idea –a theme or a motif– resists a translation or a conceptual explanation of 
its content, its autonomous form is not mere play of sensations. For precisely as mere form, the musical theme 
reveals something. It reveals, first, the thought of the composer, which after all, was a musical thought to begin 
with, arising from the active imagination of the composer. Second, the musical theme reveals the individuality 
of the composer, his character, given that the musical idea arises from his own imagination. The composer’s 
individuality is not revealed by the music being a translation of his conceptual thoughts or feelings, but rather 
his individuality shows itself in the specific way in which he has put the shared musical rules to work in his 
music. These are not mere images, pictures, or representations of something not music. Rather, the process 
of shaping musical forms out of the materials of melody, harmony, and rhythm takes place in the very same 
medium of music that we encounter when listening to the performances of the composer’s works. 
Third, the musical theme reveals its own purposiveness, its own internal harmony. In Kant’s account, 
we must assume such purposiveness in order to make sense of our system of discursive knowledge: insofar as 
we are to see nature, not as a mere mechanistic aggregate of facts, but as a unified system, we must approach 
it from the perspective of an aesthetic judgment (cf. CPJ 20: 217). And sure enough, in accordance with this 
view, in the first edition of his essay, removed from the later editions, Hanslick makes a claim even more 
grandiose. After reminding the reader of his claim about the individuality of the composer leaving its mark on 
music, he writes: 
In the psyche of the listener, furthermore, this intellectual substance unites the beautiful in music with all other grand 
and beautiful ideas. Music affects the psyche not merely and absolutely by means of its own particular beauty, but rather 
2 Payzant (1986) translates Zweckmässigkeit as “appropriateness”; Rothfarb and Landerer (2018) translate it as “functionality”. I have 
used the latter translation with the exception that I have used “purposiveness” as the translation of Zweckmässigkeit. This is the stan-
dard translation of the term as it appears in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, where the term actually originates (CPJ §10).
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simultaneously as a sounding reflection of the great motions of the cosmos. Through profound and covert relationships to 
nature, the significance of tones increases far above themselves, and allows us at the same time to feel the infinite in the 
work of human talent. Because the elements of music –sound, tone, rhythm, forcefulness, gentleness– exist in the entire 
universe, so does man discover the entire universe in music. (Hanslick, 2018: 120)
My proposal is that, for Hanslick, the purposiveness of musical form is a sounding image of the formal 
features of the universe when approached aesthetically, i.e., not conceptually. If read in light of Kant’s view, 
this way of perceiving reality is qualitatively different from, yet on a par with, the conceptual, mechanical way 
of cognizing the facts of the world.  
Recall Szabados’s concession that the early Wittgenstein may have been a formalist, who thought that 
“logic shows the structure of the world, while tunes and themes show the structure of music” (Szabados, 2014: 
46). I want to conclude this article by suggesting that, for Wittgenstein, music shows more than that. As ex-
plained in section 3, for the early Wittgenstein, logical form is the necessary condition for the possibility of 
facts – both linguistic and non-linguistic. Logical form is not just the form of thought but the form of reality as 
well. Indeed, Wittgenstein claims it to be the form of every imaginable world (TLP 2.022). However, while be-
ing the necessary condition for the possibility of meaningful language, logical form itself cannot be expressed 
in language: it cannot be said, but only “shows itself” (TLP 4.121). Wittgenstein writes: “Propositions can 
represent the whole of reality, but cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be 
able to represent it – logical form.” (TLP 4.12) This is to say that logical form cannot be explained or expressed 
in any medium external to itself. In this respect, logical form resembles the form of music as understood by 
formalism. What makes the case intriguing is the fact that, in the course of making this very argument, Witt-
genstein appeals repeatedly to music. 
When discussing the form of reality in the beginning of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that complex 
states of affairs and ultimately the entire reality is composed of simple elements, namely, objects. Objects 
are the unalterable substance of the world, which he characterizes as “form and content” (TLP 2.023, 2.014, 
2.025). Interestingly, while refusing to give any concrete examples of objects, Wittgenstein refers to notes in 
his explanation of the objects’ formal essence. Like the simple objects, whose forms make it possible for them 
to combine into states of affairs, so too notes “must have some pitch” that allow them to form musical themes 
(TLP 2.0131). Moreover, in explaining his central idea that also propositions are structured facts, Wittgenstein 
writes: “A proposition is not a blend of words. […] A proposition is articulate. – (Just as a theme in music is 
not a blend of notes.)” (TLP 3.141). In elaborating the core idea of the picture theory of language, namely, that 
a meaningful “proposition is a picture of reality”, Wittgenstein refers to the essential connection between lan-
guage and the world, brought about by logical form shared by the two (TLP 4.03). And again, Wittgenstein’s 
example of such an essential connection is from the realm of music:
A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the soundwaves, all stand to one another in the same inter-
nal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. (TLP 4.014). 
As Wittgenstein explains, continuing the above remark, “They all have a common logical construction” 
(TLP 4.0143). 
Now, logic treats the formal properties of the states of affairs and their constituent objects. These formal 
properties –contrasted with the external, empirical properties of objects– are mirrored (reflected, displayed, 
“made manifest”) in the structural properties of propositions and thoughts (TLP 4.122-4.125, 3.13). It follows 
that propositions of logic are tautologies: they are empty of empirical content as they do not picture any em-
pirical states of affairs. Accordingly, they do not have sense, which according to the Tractatus requires not only 
form but also empirical content. Tautologies are “sinnlos”, “directionless”. Yet, Wittgenstein emphasizes that 
tautologies are not nonsensical (“unsinnig”), as they still show or display their own logical form (TLP 4.46-
4.462). Precisely as tautologies, abstracted away from empirical content, the propositions of logic “show the 
formal –logical– properties of the world”, as Wittgenstein writes (TLP 6.12, see TLP 6.124, 6.22). 
3 Translation altered. The original text reads: “Ihnen allen is der logische Bau gemeinsam”.
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Now consider again Wittgenstein’s notebook entry from 1915, evoked by Szabados: “A tune is a kind of 
tautology, it is complete in itself; it satisfies itself” (NB 40). Instead of resembling a meaningful proposition 
that says something by picturing a state of affairs, the tune only shows its form. And by doing just that, I would 
like to argue, music figures as the model of logical form in its purest sense. For just like propositions of logic 
that do not say anything about the specific facts of the world but merely show the form necessary for the pos-
sibility of thought and reality, so too musical themes show that form. Hence, it should not be surprising that 
Wittgenstein states that “Knowledge of the nature of logic will […] lead to knowledge of the nature of music” 
(NB 40).
In my reading, the import of these remarks is this: in the context of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, 
musical themes serve to make intuitively (i.e., sensuously4) available the idea of logical form showing itself in-
dependently of any empirical, “sayable” content. This is because, as suggested by Wittgenstein’s remark about 
tunes as tautologies, the musical theme has the form of sense without any possibility of giving empirical con-
tent to that form (TLP 3.13). Yet, even without content, the form itself is shown to be purposive, as I would like 
to say, because of Wittgenstein’s further remark that the “the tune is complete in itself and satisfies itself”. In 
this way, the core idea of the Tractatus, i.e., the idea of logical form that cannot be expressed in language but is 
shown, displayed, or made manifest, is made tangible without resorting to a conceptual explanation, which has 
been ruled out by Wittgenstein’s statement that propositions cannot represent logical form (TLP p. 3, 2.172, 
2.174, 4.121, 6.22). In short, –dramatic as it may sound– that logical form, which for the early Wittgenstein 
is constitutive of language, thought, and reality, is shown not just in propositions of logic but also in music. 
Now, Szabados may grant as much, given that he reads the early Wittgenstein as a theoretical thinker, 
obsessed by form. However, as argued in section 3, Szabados’s interpretation overlooks the fact that both the 
early and the later Wittgenstein take logic or grammar to be independent of empirical facts and indeed ground-
ing the possibility of empirical statements. In my reading, Wittgenstein’s appeal to music serves the role of il-
lustrating this autonomy of logic or grammar from empirical facts both in his early and later stages of thought. 
In a manuscript dictated to his students in 1935 and later published as the Brown Book, Wittgenstein 
states:
The same strange illusion which we are under when we seem to seek something which a face expresses whereas, in reality, 
we are giving ourselves up to the features before us –that same illusion possesses us even more strongly if repeating a tune 
to ourselves and letting it make its full impression on us, we say “This tune says something”, and it is as though I had to 
find what it says. And yet I know that it doesn’t say anything such that I might express in words or pictures what it says. 
And if, recognizing this, I resign myself to saying “It just expresses a musical thought”, this would mean no more that 
saying “It expresses itself”. (BB 166)
Again, we find Wittgenstein agreeing with Hanslick on several points. Like Hanslick, Wittgenstein takes 
up a musical tune, rather than an entire work, as the phenomenon of interest. He denies that the content of the 
tune (whatever it is that the tune says) could be translated into words of pictures. And he concludes that, given 
the impossibility of translation, the content of the tune is “a musical thought”, which amounts to saying that 
the musical tune expresses itself, because the tune and the thought stand in a constitutive relation. The punch 
line is that we cannot say what the musical tune expresses, as it only expresses or shows itself. 
In section 527 of Philosophical Investigations, quoted above, Wittgenstein repeats the point that “I 
should not be able to say” what a musical theme is about. All I can do is to compare the theme with something 
else that has the same pattern [Linie] (PI §527). The immediate context of these remarks is Wittgenstein’s 
alignment between the understanding of music and the understanding of language. In Wittgensten’s view, the 
two are more like one another than one is inclined to think. In the Brown Book, the same point is explained as 
follows: 
4 That Kant’s account of logic and aesthetics as the two necessary components of cognitive judgments was not foreign to Wittgen-
stein is shown in Wittgenstein’s remark, dictated to G. E. Moore in 1914. Referring to his own notion of internal, formal relations, 
Wittgenstein states: “We might thus give sense to the assertion that logical laws are forms of thought and space and time are forms 
of intuition” (NB 118). 
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But I don’t mean that understanding a musical theme is is more like the picture which one tends to make oneself under-
standing a sentence; but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is more like what happens 
when we understand a tune than at first sight appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside 
the sentence. Whereas one might say “Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the 
sentence is in the sentence.” (BB 167)
This remark takes up the early view of a melody being complete in itself without reference to external 
reality, and connects it with the major theme of Wittgenstein’s later account, namely, the understanding of lan-
guage. The core commitment that music expresses itself is thus sustained, but now the implications are taken 
to apply to language in general.  
As explained above, the major transition from Wittgenstein’s early to his later philosophy is his later 
rejection of the Tractarian idea that every meaningful proposition must be a picture of a state of affairs, i.e. 
have empirical content, which is what the proposition “says” (TLP 4.022). But one may see a structural affinity 
between Wittgenstein’s early and the later views on those sentences that are not straightforwardly empirical, 
explainable by reference to a fact, between logical and grammatical sentences, that is. In Wittgenstein’s mature 
thought, this continuity finds expression in Wittgenstein’s appeal to music as exemplifying the possibility of 
a sentence or a tune being comprehensible inspite of resisting a translation. Wittgenstein writes: “We speak 
of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also 
in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than a musical theme can be replaced by 
another)” (PI §531). In the latter case, what matters is “these words in these positions” (PI §531), that is, the 
internal, formal purposiveness of the sentence. 
What I am suggesting is that the internal, formal purposiveness is not only a feature of a musical tune 
when approached from the aesthetic perspective. It is also the fundamental characteristic of our language, as 
understood by Wittgenstein. Like music, which does not yield to a mechanistic model of explanation but re-
quires to be described as a system constituted by its autonomous rules, so too language when approached from 
the philosophical perspective calls to be grasped as a family of structures, each of which is a unified, purposive 
whole (cf. M 8: 59). This is what music, as a system constituted by its own autonomous rules, allows us to hear.
7. Concluding Remarks
The leitmotif of this entire paper has been the distinction between the empirical and the grammatical as 
it appears in Wittgenstein’s thought. In section 3 on Theory, I argued for the importance of the distinction in 
Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, claiming that the differences between Wittgenstein’s early and later 
accounts should not conceal the deep continuity in Wittgenstein’s treatment of logic and grammar. In section 
4 on Beauty, I argued that the distinction surfaces in the domain of aesthetic judgments as the distinction be-
tween judgments of the agreeable and the beautiful. Just as much as philosophy in general, aesthetics deals 
with a phenomenon that, when described by the philosopher, is shown to be laden with normative (not merely 
empirical or factual) judgments. In section 5 on Rules, I argued that the appeal to rules is motivated by the 
attempt to show how the grammatical may in fact be distinguished from the merely empirical in both language 
and music. Finally, in section 6 on Music and Reality, I argued that music serves as a non-conceptually given 
model of the formal features of reality for both Hanslick and the early Wittgenstein. The later Wittgenstein 
does not draw a sharp distinction between language and reality. Still, in accordance with his younger self, who 
took propositions of logic to show the essence of the world, the later Wittgenstein states: “Essence is expressed 
by grammar” (PI §271; see TLP 5.4711, 6.22). Music serves to make this point available: it makes available 
the idea of our ability to grasp language and reality independently of conceptual explanation.
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